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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to provide an alternative
model which can be used to test for oligopsony market
power applying plant-level data. For this purpose,
we took into account empirical studies and specific
developments in the Hungarian dairy industry and
specified a model that provides useful benchmarks for
an econometric test of market power. The results of the
econometric analysis show that the effects from policy
changes in Hungary, as well as from plant specific issues
are highly statistically significant, and produce evidence
suggesting the exercise of oligopsony market power in
the Hungarian dairy industry.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, numerous studies on New Empirical
Industrial Organization (NEIO) have been conducted.
These studies paid special attention to measuring market
power in agricultural and food markets. In most of these
studies, e.g. Schroeter (1988), Azzam and Pagoulatos
(1990), and Schroeter and Azzam (1990), evidence of
buyer and/or seller market power in the U.S. beef packing
industry was produced by interpreting market level data.
Morrison Paul (2001), conducting a plant-level analysis,
found market power to be present in both the cattle input
and beef output market. In contrast to the majority of these
studies, Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) could not prove the
existence of oligopsony power in the U.S. beef packing
industry. A result that was also obtained by Hyde and
Perloff (1998) for oligopsony market power in the
Australian retail meat sector, and by Quagrainie et al.
(2003) for processor power in the Canadian cattle and
hog markets.
In the recent past, agricultural economists have
started to focus on the analysis of market structure and
pricing in the market for raw milk in the Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Perekhozhuk
(2007) used a production function framework to investi-
gate production technology and to test for market power
in the Ukrainian milk processing industry. Anders (2008)
estimated the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony market
power in the German food retail industry by evaluating a
set of monthly retail beef and pork marketing data of the
federal state of Hesse. Applying the revenue function
approach, Hockmann and Vöneki (2009) found
considerable oligopsony market power in the Hungarian
milk market. The econometric results obtained by Bakucs
et al. (2010) have revealed the existence of oligopsony
market power in the Hungarian slaughter hog market.
At this point, it is necessary to underline that all of
these studies relied on the New Empirical Industrial
Organization theory (NEIO) and used market-level data,
which were available only to a limited extent, to estimate
the degree of market power at a national level. At a regional
level, as far as we know, the degree of market power has
been estimated only by Wann and Sexton (1992), Weliwita
and Azzam (1996), Koontz and Garcia (1997), Anders (2008)
as well as Perekhozhuk, Grings, and Glauben (2009); and in
so doing have found evidence of market power.
There are a lot of empirical studies that have
estimated and tested for oligopoly and/or oligopsony
power on the basis of industry-level data, while there is
only little literature on such studies analyzing plant-level
data. Morrison Paul (2001), using plant-level data of U.S.
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beef packing plants, identified the presence of market
power based on estimating input demand equations
derived from a Generalized-Leontief-Quadratic cost func-
tion. Moreover, the parameter of market power was spe-
cified as a function of the number of cattle buyers, the
expenditures for cattle procurement, the overtime pay-
ments to workers, and others variables.
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis
of market power at plant-level and to identify plant-spe-
cific effects that may affect both market structure and
pricing in the Hungarian dairy industry. Using a unique
plant-level data set in this paper, we will, therefore, focus
on specifying a parameter for oligopsony power that
takes into account policy changes in Hungary, the
ownership form of enterprises as well as plant-specific
issues.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes, in depth, the restructuring process in the
Hungarian dairy sector that is, currently changing the
market structure in the Hungarian dairy sector.
Section 3 provides a theoretical model which may be
used to test the plant’s conjectural elasticities. The mod-
el’s estimates are applied to develop an econometric test
for market behavior based on plant-level data in
Section 4. Descriptions of data sources and variables
used in the econometric analysis are presented in
Section 5. Estimation results and specification tests of
the parameter of oligopsony market power are discussed
in Section 6. The final section summarizes our results and
draws conclusions.
2 Structural change in the
Hungarian dairy sector
After the fall of the planned economic system and the
beginning of the transition period, a restructuring process
in the Hungarian economy – and with it, the dairy sector,
set in. And indeed, the Hungarian dairy industry as part
of this economy had to undergo severe changes leading
to an unexpected dramatic decrease in both the milk
production and milk processing sector. Table 1 presents
available figures of the milk production sector for
selected years. Between 2000 and 2007, the number of
dairy cows decreased by 25.1% or 89 thousand, from 355
to 266 thousand head. Despite this sharp decline, milk
production declined by 15.8% or 95 thousand metric tons,
from 2,137 to 1,448 thousand metric tons as the annual
milk yield per cow increased by 905 kg, from 6,020 to
6,925 kg. Surprisingly, however, milk deliveries to the
processing plants declined by 382 thousand metric tons
(from 1,830 to 1,448 thousand metric tons) leading the
share of milk deliveries in milk production to fall by 7%.
According to Hockmann and Vöneki (2009), the reduc-
tion in milk deliveries to the processing plants largely
results from increasing raw milk exports to Italy, while
imports of raw milk, mainly from Slovakia, only
constitute a marginal share in milk processing.
Between 2000 and 2007, the number of dairy farms
plummeted by 23,020 dairy farms, almost to a third of the
original number, and amounted only to 34.6%. Given the
number of dairy farms by size of dairy herd in Table 1, it
is obvious that the Hungarian milk production sector is
dominated by one of the two following forms of agricul-
tural farms: (1) individual dairy farms (small-scale dairy
farms) and (2) industrial dairy farms (large-scale dairy
farms). In the literature on transition economics, one
distinguishes between two forms of agricultural produc-
tion in transition economies which develop with large-
scale and small-scale agriculture. On the one hand, there
are individual farms (one-man farm), so-called personal
subsidiary plots (private family plots or private subsidiary
plots), that have from one, but not more than ten heads
of milk cows. On the other hand, there are industrial
dairy farms that generally own ten or more head of milk
cows. This dual structure of agricultural production is
characteristic for Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEEC), New Independent States (NIS), China,
and India (OECD 1999, 68–9).
From Table 1 it can be seen that the number of
individual farms that own between 1 and 9 cows was
significantly reduced by 23,110 dairy farms, from 32,890
to 9,780 dairy farms, and thus in 2007, amounted to only
29.7% of the original number. Despite this significant
drop in the number of individual dairy farms, their
share remained high, accounting for 80.4% of all dairy
farms. Surprisingly, the number of dairy farms with more
than 50 cows also decreased, by 210, from 750 to 540
dairy farms whereas the number of dairy farms with
between 10 and 49 dairy cows slightly increased by 270
dairy farms, and thus amounted to 17.2% of all dairy
farms.
The Statistical Office of the European Union
(EUROSTAT) released statistical data on the number of
dairies by size (milk processing enterprises by volume of
annual milk collection), which are presented in Table 2.
From this table it is apparent that, in 2003 and 2006,
there were 49 and 37 dairies that annually collected and
processed 100 thousand metric tons of raw milk or less in
Hungary, compared to Germany where there were 138
and 128 dairies, respectively. Although the number of
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dairies in both countries decreased by about 10 milk
processing enterprises within 3 years, the development
within the size classes differed significantly (between the
two countries). In Germany, there were more than 63
dairies that processed more than 100 thousand metric
tons as compared to only four dairies in the same class
in Hungary in 2003. The Hungarian figures for 2006 of
the two highest classes (more than 100 metric tons per
annum) are not available since data provided by
EUROSTAT are confidential for this year. Their number
is, therefore, open to conjecture; we suppose that
there could have been three dairies at a maximum (cf.
Table 2).
Despite the fact that the number of dairy plants in the
lowest class (≤ 5,000 t/year) decreased, their number still
remains high and amounts to more than 40% of all dairy
plants in the industry. In Germany, on the other hand,
these dairy plants make up less than 20%. Moreover, the
share of dairies with an annual collection volume of
equal or less than 20,000 metric tons account for more
than 75% in Hungary and around 29% in Germany.
Compared to Germany, the Hungarian dairy industry is
comprised of a few large and many small milk processing
plants (dairies).
At this point it is helpful to look at measures suitable
for making further statements on concentration processes
of the Hungarian dairy sector. We, therefore, calculated the
concentration of plants in the industry. The calculation had
to be based on firm-level rather than plant-level data
because of confidentiality reasons that would not have
disclosed either name or owners of dairy plants. Thus,
using individual plant data would have led to ambiguous
results as a single firm may have multiple plants. However,
most Hungarian dairy firms are single-plant firms. Only
two multi-plant firms operate five dairy plants. Data
sources came from the Institute of Economics of the
Hungarian Academy of Science (IEHAS) and were collected
by the Hungarian Tax Authority.
Table 3 contains the number of dairy plants ðNÞ, the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and the three
selected concentration ratios CR1ð Þ, CR4ð Þ, and CR10ð Þ,
denoting the largest, the four, and the ten largest dairy
plants, respectively. Looking at the whole period from a
1993 to 2006, the number of dairy plants decreased from
35 to 21, though not steadily as the lowest number of 19
was reported for the years 2003 and 2004. Again, for
confidentiality reasons, we cannot accurately specify
whether the decline in the number of milk processing
plants was associated with the exit of plants from the
industry, mergers or acquisitions.
However, a straightforward comparison between the
number of dairy plants from Table 3 and the number of
dairy farms (agricultural and individual farms) from
Table 1 yields marked differences: In 2005, there were
only 20 dairy plants compared to 16,250 dairy farms.
From this, we conclude that the market structure of the
Table 2 Number of dairies by volume of annual milk collection in
metric tons.
Item Germany Hungary
2003 2006 2003 2006
Number of dairy plants 201 190 53 39*
Number of dairy plants by
classes of volume of milk
collection (t/year):
5,000 or less 39 37 26 16
Between 5,001 and 20,000 25 21 11 12
Between 20,001 and 50,000 33 33 8 4
Between 50,001 and 100,000 41 37 4 5
Between 100,001 and 300,000 43 40 3 (c)
More than 300,000 20 22 1 (c)
Notes: The superscript * denotes rough estimates calculated by the
authors based on data from EUROSTAT. (c) denotes that data are not
published for confidentiality reasons.
Source: EUROSTAT.
Table 1 Development of the milk production sector in Hungary for
selected years.
Item 2000 2003 2005 2007
Number of dairy cows,
1,000 head
355 310 285 266
Annual milk yield,
kg per cow*
6,020 6,552 6,768 6,925
Milk production, 1,000 t 2,137 2,031 1,929 1,842
Milk collection, 1,000 t 1,830 1,717 1,518 1,448
Milk collection share
in/of milk production, %*
86 85 79 79
Number of dairy farms 35,190 22,000 16,250 12,170
Number of dairy farms
by size of dairy herd:
Between 1 and 2 21,850 13,050 7,090 4,610
Between 3 and 9 11,040 6,840 6,760 5,170
Between 10 and 19 1,130 980 1,160 1,210
Between 20 and 29 270 280 390 290
Between 30 and 49 170 190 190 340
Between 50 and 99 140 170 210 120
100 or more 610 490 460 420
Notes: The superscript * denotes authors’ calculation based on data
from EUROSTAT and FAOSTAT.
Source: EUROSTAT and FAOSTAT.
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Hungarian market for raw milk is oligopsonistic,1 all the
more so because the calculated average of milk suppliers
(i.e., dairy farm) per milk processor (i.e., dairy plant)
amounts to 813. Similar conclusions with respect to the
market structure of Hungarian diary industry have been
reached by many other authors.
Juhász and Stauder (2006) analyzed the concentra-
tion of Hungarian food retailing and supplier–retailer
relationships by calculating the concentration ratios of
the top five firms and their sum of market shares. From
the single concentration ratios of 18%, 17%, 9%, 8%, and
6% (in descending order) and their joint market share of
net sales in the industry 58%, they concluded that the
market structure of the Hungarian dairy industry may be
best described as duopolistic, i.e. the dairy industry is
dominated by two large milk processors.
In our analysis, we calculated the concentration
ratios for the largest individual dairy plants in terms of
revenue from sale of products for the period from 1993 to
2006. In doing so, we found that the market share of the
four largest dairy plants nearly doubled from 33.67% to
65.64% (Table 3).
In 2006, the concentration ratio of the ten largest
plants CR10ð Þ made up almost 90% of the total output
of the dairy industry. At the same time, the market share
of the largest dairy plant tripled, increasing from 10.7% to
36.1%.2 Mellen and Evans (2010, 151) point out that “a
company with a 20% market share may be able to dom-
inate an industry when no other company possesses more
than 5% of the market. However, a 20% market share
where two competitors each control 40% leaves the com-
pany in a much weaker position.” So as not to rely solely
on concentration ratios but also on a more complete
measure of industry concentration we calculated the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for the Hungarian dairy
industry. Since we measured percentage of market share
held by dairy plants in an industry, the concentration
ratio ranges from 0 to 100 and the HHI from 0 to
10,000. For the period from 1993 to 2006 we obtained
HHIs ranging from 496.6 to 1,721.4. Thus, according to
the Classification of the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission,3 the Hungarian dairy
industry is moderately concentrated.
Considering the structural change in the Hungarian
dairy sector and reasons for oligopsony power, we can
hypothesize that milk processors (dairy plants) may exer-
cise market power in the input market for raw milk.
Moreover, Hockmann and Vöneki (2009) estimated
industry-wide indexes of market power and found evi-
dence of oligopsony power. In addition to many NEIO
studies, the purpose of this paper is to provide an
alternative model that may be used to test for oligopsony
market power based on plant-level data without
additional assumptions about the aggregation of plant’s
marginal product, and consequently of plant’s conjec-
tural elasticities which must be taken into account
when applying industry-level data (cf. Azzam and
Pagoulatos 1990; Schroeter and Azzam 1990; Muth and
Wohlgenant 1999).
Table 3 Concentration Ratio and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.
Year N CR1 CR4 CR10 HHI 1/N
1993 35 10.65 33.67 66.47 549.9 285.7
1994 36 11.35 34.01 66.07 546.5 277.8
1995 40 9.95 31.26 63.06 496.6 250.0
1996 40 9.99 33.71 63.26 507.1 250.0
1997 36 11.53 38.18 66.23 575.4 277.8
1998 40 13.10 38.50 70.00 616.1 250.0
1999 35 21.76 51.69 82.75 965.1 285.7
2000 35 23.00 56.89 84.63 1,079.4 285.7
2001 32 20.02 55.92 83.78 1,048.6 312.5
2002 24 21.43 61.30 90.11 1,241.7 416.7
2003 19 31.60 70.77 92.63 1,670.5 526.3
2004 19 27.28 68.50 92.63 1,451.4 526.3
2005 20 24.32 65.59 90.65 1,306.1 500.0
2006 21 36.16 65.64 87.52 1,721.4 476.2
Source: Own calculations based on plant-level data provided by the
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Science.
1 Many studies carried out on milk markets in industrialized coun-
tries, point out reasons for the existence of oligopsony power such
as the perishable nature of raw milk, high storage and transport
costs, and limited access to alternative milk buyers. Alvarez et al.
(2000) examined processor oligopsony power in the procurement of
milk in one Spanish region and found that Spanish dairy processors
exercise spatial oligopsony power over dairy farmers. Graubner et al.
(2011) investigated spatial competition in the German raw milk
market and found evidence that price transmission between produ-
cers and processors is in line with cooperative or non-cooperative
behavior.
2 The results on concentration ratios for the largest dairy plants are
similar to the calculations performed by König and Major (2006)
who considered the market share of the largest dairy firms in
Hungarian dairy industry in 2004 and 2005.
3 The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission that classify the spectrum of market
concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions: (1) uncon-
centrated (HHI below 1,000), (2) moderately concentrated (HHI
between 1,000 and 1,800), and (3) highly concentrated (HHI above
1,800).
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3 Theoretical framework
Assuming that there are N dairy plants (milk processors)
in the milk processing, the industry is producing a
homogeneous product ðyÞ by employing the two factors,
raw milk ðmÞ and other non-agricultural inputs ðzÞ. The
production function of the ith dairy plant is given by:
yi ¼ f ðmi; ziÞ; ½1
where yi is the output quantity of milk and milk products
produced by the ith dairy plant, mi is the input quantity of
raw milk bought by the ith dairy plant, and zi is the
quantity of non-agricultural inputs used by this dairy plant.
It is assumed that each dairy plant faces two different
market situations: for one thing, it may exercise some
buyers’ market power when purchasing raw milk inputs
mi, but, for another, all dairy plants act as price takers in
both the market for other non-agricultural inputs zi, and
in the selling market of their outputs yi. The dairy indus-
try’s market supply curve in its input market for raw milk
can be expressed as inverse function:
WM ¼ gðM; SÞ; ½2
where WM denotes the market price of raw milk, M the
total of raw milk purchased by all dairy plants in the
dairy industry such that M ¼P
N
i¼1
mi, and S is a vector of
supply shifters.
Given the objective of each dairy plant to maximize
its profit πi, and given both the production function [1]
and the supply function of raw milk [2], the profit equa-
tion for the ith dairy plant may be defined as:
πi ¼ Pf ðmi; ziÞ WMmi WZzi; ½3
where πi is the profit earned by the ith dairy plant, P is
the output price of the milk processing industry, WM and
WZ are market prices of raw milk and other non-agricul-
tural inputs, respectively.
The first order condition for profit maximization with
respect to raw milk input, which allows for imperfect
competition in this market, is given by:
@πi
@mi
¼ P @f ðmi; ziÞ
@mi
WM 1þ ’i
"
 
¼ 0; ½4
or
WM ¼ Pfmi
1þ ’i"
  ; ½5
where ’i ¼ @M=@mið Þ mi=Mð Þ is the ith dairy plant’s con-
jectural elasticity in the input market for raw milk,
" ¼ @M=@WMð Þ WM=Mð Þ is the market price elasticity of
raw milk supply and fmi is the marginal product of raw
milk input used by the ith dairy plant.
According to Appelbaum (1982), and Azzam and
Pagoulatos (1990), the dairy plants’ conjectural elastici-
ties provide useful benchmarks for the econometric test
for market behavior. If ’i ¼ 0, then the input market for
raw milk is perfectly competitive, i. e. the marginal pro-
duct of raw milk of each dairy plant equals the market
price WM. If ’i ¼ 1, then the market for raw milk is
monopsonistic or the dairy plants act like a monopsony
(cartel) and consequently the marginal factor cost should
be equal to the value marginal product. Intermediate
values of ’i imply the presence of oligopsonistic market
behavior in varying degrees. An implication that leaves
the first-order condition open to the interpretation that
the “perceived” marginal factor cost equals the aggregate
value of the marginal products of raw milk.
4 Econometric specification of the
model
Due tomissing firm-level data, many empirical NEIO studies
alternatively estimated industry’s average conjectural elasti-
cities applying industry-level data to a modified framework
including additional assumptions about conjectural elasti-
cities and marginal products, respectively. In contrast to
these studies, we used dairy plant data to estimate plant’s
conjectural elasticities. For econometric implementation,
however, we needed to select a specific form of production
function [1]. In NEIO studies, the production technology is
usually represented by a flexible function form, e.g. the
translog production function which was introduced by
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1971, 1973).
The translog production function, in the context of
plant-level data, can be written as follows:
ln yi ¼ α0 þ
XJ
j¼1
αj ln xji þ 12
XJ
j¼1
XK
k¼1
αjk ln xji ln xki
þ γtt þ
1
2
γttt
2 þ
XJ
j¼1
γjt ln xjit;
½6
where subscript i is the index of plants in the dairy
industry i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;Nð Þ and j ¼ 1; 2 . . . ; J; k ¼ 1; 2 :::;K
are the indexes of the inputs; ln yi denotes the logarithm
of the output quantity of the ith dairy plant, and ln xji the
logarithm of the jth input quantity used by the ith milk
processing plant. The variable t captures the time-trend
to account for technical change in the dairy industry.
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Considering the cost structure of the dairy industry,
we assume that milk processing plants use only three
factors of production, namely, raw milk mi, capital ci,
and labor li. Given the specific production function [6],
the first-order condition for profit maximization with
respect to raw milk [5] can be rewritten as follows:
WM ¼ P yimi
αm þ αmm ln mi þ αmc ln ci þ αml ln li þ γmttð Þ
1þ ’i"
  ;
½7
Interpreting the price elasticity of raw milk supply ε as
exogenous constant point,4 the parameter of plant’s con-
jectural elasticities ’i can be econometrically tested based
on the estimation of production function [6] together with
the first order condition for profit maximization that allows
for imperfect competition [7]. For econometric reasons,
homoscedastic disturbance terms were added.
Since eq. [7] is intrinsically nonlinear in its parameters,
the translog production function [6] and the first-order
condition for profit maximization [7] can be simultaneously
estimated using the nonlinear least-squares (NLS) estima-
tion technique.5 Additionally, the exogenous variable price
elasticity of raw milk supply was set " ¼ 0:1. The value was
taken as previously estimated in other empirical studies,
for example, by Suzuki, Lenz, and Forker (1993), Lopez,
Altobello, and Shah (1994), and Perekhozhuk (2007,
172–87). The estimation itself was carried out using the
statistical software Stata (cf. Stata 2009, 459–80).
5 Description of statistical data
source
In order to test for the existence of oligopsony power in
the Hungarian dairy industry, we used plant-level data
collected, as mentioned earlier, by the Hungarian Tax
Authority. The records included an almost universal sam-
ple of dairy plants since they were provided by double-
entry bookkeeping.6 Besides a common balance sheet,
the dairy plant data include income statement informa-
tion such as output, labor, capital, material input, and
information on the form of ownership of the dairy plants
(private, wholly foreign owned and government or state
owned enterprises). But again, as mentioned before, we
did not receive any information on either the names or
owners of the dairy plants. But in order to test for market
power, we created a panel data set comprising individual
information about dairy plants’ net revenue, material
cost, capital, and labor inputs. The data set includes, in
total, 432 plant-level observations made in the investiga-
tion period of 1993–2006. The data set is an unbalanced
panel as dairy plants with contiguous and non-contigu-
ous time series are included.
The original data set included 455 observations. 23
observations were omitted because the three dairy plants
had zero production output (net revenue) and material
inputs. The final number of plants in our unbalanced
panel data set is 88 plants. The number of dairy plants
changes from year to year, varying between 19 and 40
dairies. The different number of plants over time is due to
entry and exit of dairy plants in the sample, with more
plants exiting than entering. The observed periods for
sample plants range from 1 to 14 years. Table 4 counts
the number of observations and the life duration of dairy
plants over the observed period. In the year-by-year analy-
sis, we find that in the first 2 years of our sample period, 18
of the 88 samples containing dairy plants were liquidated,
notably 13 plants in 1993 and 5 plants in 1994 (cf. Table 4).
There are two main reasons for the mass exit of plants
from the dairy industry in the first year. The first reason
associated with the new bankruptcy law in Hungary,
which came into force in January 1992. According to this
new law, the plants with arrears of 90 days or more were
required to file for reorganization referred as bankruptcy or
liquidation.7 Disaggregation of the data reveals a consider-
able variation in industry entry and exit patterns over time.
Almost one half of the dairy plants in our sample (48.9%)
have been in business for not more than 3 years and
hereby 24 plants in the sample have been operating only
for 1 year. Economic theory suggest that entry to industry
increase competition in industry, and put pressure on
existing plants to operate as efficiently as possible.
However, looking more closely at our sample, we found
that the dairy plants exiting in the first year produce only
5.6% of the industry output over the entire period. The
new entering dairy plants were considerably, in terms of
production output, smaller than existing dairy plants. They
have high rates of failure. Moreover, during the observed
period more plants have exited than entered the industry.
4 Similar assumptions may be found in the works of
Schroeter (1988), Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) and Morrison Paul
(2001).
5 Details on estimation methods are given in Greene (2003, 339–77)
and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 214–22).
6 For a more detailed description of the data collection see Békés,
Harasztosi, and Muraközy (2009).
7 According to the data on reorganization and liquidation of firms
represented by Gray, Schlorke, and Szanyi (1995) most of firms in
Hungary were liquidated rather than reorganized.
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Only 16 of the 88 dairy plants in Hungarian dairy industry
have been in business for 10 and more years, and operate
approximately 50% of the industry output over the inves-
tigation period. Moreover, these facts suggest that the
existing dairy plants tended to be large relative to all
plants in dairy industry.
The second main reason is that privatization of state
owned enterprises (SOEs) in Hungary was significantly
undertaken in the 1990s. Table 5 gives the evolution over
time of the number of dairy plants (observations) in the
ownership categories. The number of dairy plants registered
as state enterprises declined from 21 in 1993 to 1 in 2003.
The number of privately owned dairy plants rose
from 9 in 1993 to 26 in 1996 and then receded to 10 in
2004 and again rose to 16 in 2006. In the first half of the
sample period, the number of foreign owned dairy plants
in Hungary increased from 2 in 1993 to 10 in 1999. Since
then the number of foreign owned dairy plants has
decreased and composed only 4 dairies in 2006.
However, as shown in Figure 1, the foreign owned
plants play an important role in the Hungarian dairy
industry. They expanded their market share from 9.8%
in 1993 to 81.4% in 2004. Moreover, the market share of
the 4 foreign owned dairy plants was close to 55% in
2006. At the same time, the market share of the 16 private
dairy plants was just 44%. It is obvious that foreign
plants are more concentrated, simply because are fewer.
Furthermore, due to the privatization of the state owned
dairy plants their market share has continually decreased
from 79.8% in 1993 to 0.5% in 2006.
Table 6 provides the descriptive summary statistics
(mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of
each variable) of the plant-level data used in the estima-
tion. In connection with the output and input variables of
the production function, we used the net revenue figures
as output quantities of dairy plants.
The difference in net revenue between the largest and
smallest dairy plants is extremely large and lies between
Table 5 Number of dairy plants (observations) by ownership categories.
Ownership 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
State 21 12 12 5 4 6 3 2 5 2 1 1 1 1 76
Private 9 17 17 26 23 24 23 24 18 16 13 10 12 16 248
Foreign 2 4 8 9 9 10 9 9 9 6 5 8 7 4 99
Other 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Total 35 36 40 40 36 40 35 35 32 24 19 19 20 21 432
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
Table 4 Number of observation and life duration of dairy plants.
Year Life duration of dairy plants (years) Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1993 13 5 4 0 3 2 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 35
1994 0 5 6 2 3 2 4 3 1 1 3 2 3 1 36
1995 5 0 5 2 4 2 5 2 1 3 3 4 3 1 40
1996 0 1 2 3 7 2 5 3 1 4 4 4 3 1 40
1997 0 2 0 3 7 2 4 3 1 2 4 4 3 1 36
1998 1 1 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 4 4 4 3 1 40
1999 0 0 1 1 3 4 5 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 35
2000 1 1 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 35
2001 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 1 32
2002 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 2 4 4 3 1 24
2003 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 3 4 2 3 1 19
2004 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 2 4 3 1 19
2005 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 1 3 2 4 3 1 20
2006 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 3 1 21
Total 24 20 27 16 45 30 35 32 18 40 44 48 39 14 432
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
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12,234.7 and 3.717 million Hungarian forint (mio HUF).
The net revenue of the dairy plants in the sample
amounts to 1,466.7 mio HUF on average.8
The variable input quantity of raw milk bought by
each dairy plant was approximated by material cost. Its
minimal and maximal values varied between 1.859 and
11,024.2 mio HUF, which corresponded to the smallest
and largest dairy plant, respectively. Capital input was
obtained from the number of tangible assets held by
dairy plants. Labor input was measured by the number
Figure 1 Market share (sales revenue) by ownership categories.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
Table 6 Summary statistics of the plant-level data.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
y Production output (net revenue, mio HUF) 1,466.7 1,981.7 3.717 12,234.7
m Material input (material cost, mio HUF) 1,258.7 1,713.5 1.859 11,024.2
c Capital input (tangible assets, mio HUF) 232.6 320.6 0.536 1,778.4
l Labor input (number of employees) 298.7 333.4 10 1,874
WM Farm price of raw milk (100 HUF per kg) 18.3 1.7 13.9 20.4
P Retail price of milk (100 HUF per kg) 35.1 2.7 31.5 41.0
t Time ðt ¼ 1993; . . . ; 2006Þ 1,998.6 3.8 1993 2006
PC Policy change 0.1388 0.3462 0 1
SE Scale of enterprise 0.2893 0.4540 0 1
PE Private enterprises 0.5740 0.4950 0 1
FE Foreign enterprises 0.2291 0.4208 0 1
GE Government enterprises 0.1759 0.3812 0 1
Notes: The Hungarian forint, denoted by the ISO code HUF, is the official currency of Hungary. For the dummy variables, policy changes (PC),
scale of enterprise (SE), private (PE), foreign owned (FE), and government enterprises (GE), the figure is the percentage of plants that take
value 1, for example, 57.40% of dairy plants are privately owned or 17.59% of dairy plants are government owned.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
8 On January 1, 2006, the monetary values of 12,234.7, 1,466.7, and
3.717 million HUF equaled 57.4, 6.9, and 17.4 thousand US Dollar,
respectively.
8 O. Perekhozhuk et al.: Identification of Market Power in the Hungarian Dairy Industry
Authenticated | ferto@econ.core.hu author's copy
Download Date | 5/7/13 8:07 AM
of employees hired per year at the dairy plants. A number
that showed significant differences: while the largest dairy
plant employed 1,874 workers, the smallest employed only
10. Data for farm price of raw milk ðWMÞ, and output price
of milk and milk products Pð Þ were provided by the
Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science. All price variables and monetary values were
deflated by the consumer price index.
In order to test for the effects of policy changes and
plant-specific effects on market power, we constructed a
binary dummy variable that could take the values 1 and
0. In case of policy changes, the dummy variable served
as proxy for the abolition of export subsidies in 2004
(Hockmann and Vöneki 2009). To create a dummy vari-
able that takes into account scaling effects, we used the
net revenue figures of the dairy plants in question. If the
net revenue was higher than the mean value, which
amounted to 1,466.7 mio HUF, then the dummy variable
was set to 1. Using the information on the ownership form
of the dairy plants, we created three dummy variables to
separately capture the effects of being either a private,
wholly foreign owned and government enterprise.
6 Estimation results and
specification testing
Concerning the estimation and interpretation of the para-
meter of market power, a number of additional aspects can
be found in other empirical studies. Based on plant-level
data, Morrison Paul (2001) came to the conclusion that the
parameter of market power has to be a function of, among
others, specific variables for the number of cattle buyers,
and the expenditures for both cattle procurement and
working overtime. Schroeter (1988) modeled the parameter
of market power as a general function of exogenous vari-
ables whose values vary with changing market conditions.
Hockmann and Vöneki (2009) introduced a binary dummy
variable to capture effects resulting from the removal of
export subsidies at the beginning of 2004 and estimated
the parameter of oligopsony power over time.
Based on conclusions of empirical NEIO studies
together with developments in the Hungarian dairy indus-
try, we extended the model of oligopsony market behavior
introduced in the theoretical section (eqs. [6] and [7]) and
estimated four market structure models. In the first model,
the parameter of oligopsony market behavior was set to
represent competitive market behavior, consequently ’C
was restricted to zero (Model 1). In the second model, the
parameter ’C was estimated to be a constant (Model 2). In
Model 3, we used dummy variables to capture various
effects from policy changes (PC) over time Tð Þ, exactly
from 1993 to 2006, and the effects of changes in scale of
enterprise (SE). Finally, instead of considering the scale
effect, Model 4 covers effects induced by the ownership
form of the plant,that is, private (PE), foreign owned (FE),
and government enterprises (GE).
For a general comparison of the estimated models,
Table 7 lists the summary of the statistical inference from
the nonlinear least-squares (NLS) estimations of the non-
linear equation system introduced above.9 Eqs. [6] (translog
production function) and [7] (first-order condition for profit
maximization) were simultaneously estimated. Hence, the
output quantity of the ith dairy plant ðyiÞ and the market
price of raw milk ðWMÞ are endogenous. The number of
estimated parameters and the values of R-squares (R2) for
each model are given in the first and second column of
Table 7. While the number of parameters in the translog
production function (eq. [6]) is constant for all models, it
increases from five to eleven in the first-order condition
(eq. [7]), in ascending order from Model 1 to Model 4.
The fit of the estimated models is quite good. The
lowest and largest R-square generated by the production
function [6] are almost equal and range from 0.9944 for
Table 7 Statistical inference of NLS estimation.
Equation Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Parameters R2 Parameters R2 Parameters R2 Parameters R2
[6] 15 0.9944 15 0.9945 15 0.9952 15 0.9952
[7]* 5 0.9783 6 0.9785 9 0.9819 11 0.9822
Notes: * Uncentered R-square.
Source: Own estimation based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
9 The feasible generalized nonlinear least-squares (FGNLS) estima-
tors were also applied, but reveal statistical inferences identical to
those reported here.
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the competition model (Model 1) to 0.9952 for Model 3
and 4, respectively. It should be noted that the eq. [7]
does not have a constant term. Therefore, an uncentered
R-square is reported.10 The lowest and the largest R-
square values for the first-order condition [7] are 0.9783
in Model 1 and 0.9822 in Model 4. Thus, altogether,
Model 4 performs slightly better.
The estimation results of the four estimated models
are presented in Table 8.11 The asymptotic standard errors
(in parentheses) indicate that most parameters are
significant, even at the 1% level. To simplify the inter-
pretation of the estimated parameter values, all model
variables were transformed into deviations from their
geometric mean. In doing so, the estimated parameters
of the translog function, namely αm, αc, and αl, can be
considered the production elasticity of raw milk, capital
and labor inputs, respectively, and moreover, the para-
meter γt captures the rate of technical change in the dairy
industry over time.
The production elasticity of raw milk was estimated to
lie between 0.97 (Model 1) and 0.95 (Model 4). The esti-
mated production elasticity of both capital and labor
proves very robust since changes appear visible only in
the second decimal place. However, not all of the estimated
parameters of the capital and labor elasticities are statisti-
cally significant. In addition, the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale was tested on the basis of the test for linear
hypotheses on the parameters of the production function
(eq. [6]), such that
P
j αj ¼ 1, where j ¼ m; c; l. The hypoth-
esis of constant returns to scale could be rejected even at
the 1% level. Thus, we estimated increasing returns to scale
in the Hungarian dairy industry. The scale elasticity was
Table 8 Estimated parameters of NLS estimation with robust standard errors
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
α0 –0.0651*** (0.0093) –0.0602*** (0.0092) –0.0617*** (0.0085) –0.0616*** (0.0085)
αm 0.9738*** (0.0059) 0.9359*** (0.0103) 0.9553*** (0.0102) 0.9519*** (0.0097)
αc 0.0197** (0.0079) 0.0262*** (0.0079) 0.0131* (0.0075) 0.0124* (0.0074)
αl 0.0231* (0.0122) 0.0600*** (0.0146) 0.0447*** (0.0138) 0.0488*** (0.0135)
γt –0.0031** (0.0016) –0.0028* (0.0015) –0.0021 (0.0014) –0.0020 (0.0014)
αmm 0.1523*** (0.0054) 0.1460*** (0.0054) 0.1461*** (0.0050) 0.1484*** (0.0049)
αcc 0.0203** (0.0086) 0.0240*** (0.0084) 0.0126 (0.0079) 0.0084 (0.0079)
αll 0.0358 (0.0227) 0.0517** (0.0223) 0.0343 (0.0218) 0.0505** (0.0207)
γtt 0.0036*** (0.0008) 0.0031*** (0.0008) 0.0038*** (0.0007) 0.0038*** (0.0007)
αmc –0.0478*** (0.0060) –0.0431*** (0.0058) –0.0271*** (0.0057) –0.0219*** (0.0058)
αml –0.1197*** (0.0099) –0.1242*** (0.0096) –0.1204*** (0.0094) –0.1319*** (0.0090)
αml –0.0157*** (0.0015) –0.0158*** (0.0014) 0.0028 (0.0024) 0.0027 (0.0024)
αcl 0.0678*** (0.0109) 0.0601*** (0.0108) 0.0499*** (0.0102) 0.0498*** (0.0100)
γct –0.0006 (0.0020) –0.0003 (0.0019) –0.0035* (0.0018) –0.0032* (0.0018)
γlt 0.0189*** (0.0029) 0.0199*** (0.0028) 0.0006 (0.0033) 0.0006 (0.0033)
’C –0.0055*** (0.0012) –0.0722*** (0.0118) –0.0961** (0.0392)
’C 0.0144*** (0.0031) 0.0136*** (0.0032)
’PC 0.2749*** (0.0348) 0.2822*** (0.0347)
’SE 0.0048** (0.0019)
’PE 0.0123 (0.0390)
’FE 0.0859** (0.0418)
’GE 0.0037 (0.0040)
Notes: The values in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Own estimation based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
10 For details on uncentered R-square see Greene (2003, 414) and
Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 241).
11 We employ different nonlinear estimation methods and proce-
dures to avoid estimation problems as autocorrelation, heteroske-
dasticity and selection bias. First, we estimated the models using a
nonlinear least-squares (NLS) estimator with robust and clustered
standard errors. Second, the feasible generalized nonlinear least-
squares (FGNLS) estimators were also applied to the models in
order to check the robustness of our results. Appendix Table A
presents the estimation results of the four estimated models using
the FGNLS estimator. The estimated coefficients are nearly identical
for both estimation methods.
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almost equal in all four models, yielding 1.02 for the first
and second model, and 1.01 for the third and fourth model.
The estimated rate of technical change γtð Þ came out nega-
tive, but not statistically significant not even at the 10%
level of statistical significance.
The estimated parameters of the first-order condition
for profit maximization were of particular interest to us
because, as stated before, they were used as a measure of
the degree of oligopsony power of dairy plants. Model 2 –
with a constant parameter specification – produced a para-
meter of oligopsony power ’C that is, close to zero and
statistically highly significant. With respect to Model 3 and
Model 4, the results especially for the dummy variables
accounting for policy changes and other plant-specific
effects are of interest. More precisely, Model 3 considers
effects of policy changes (PC) over time (T), as well as the
effects of changes in scale of enterprise (SE). The asympto-
tic standard errors indicate that all of these effects are
significant, even at the 1% level of statistical significance.
In addition, Model 4 also allows for other plant-specific
effects, that is, effects induced by the ownership form of
enterprise. While the estimated parameter for the dummy
variable of foreign enterprises ’FE appeared to be statisti-
cally significant, at least at the 5% level, the parameters for
the dummy variable of private enterprises and government
enterprises, ’PE, and ’GE, respectively, failed to do so.
Furthermore, we tested the null hypothesis for three
different subsets of parameters: the single parameter ’C
(Model 2), the subset ’C þ ’T þ ’PC þ ’SE (Model 3), and
the following subset of plant-specific effects
’C þ ’T þ ’PC þ ’PE þ ’FE þ ’GE (Model 4). Table 9 pre-
sents the results of the Wald test and the estimates of the
market power parameters; it also summarizes the impacts
of various plant-specific effects.
The asymptotic standard errors indicate that the results
are significant, even at the 1% level in all estimated models.
For the investigation period from 1993 to 2006, the
econometric results confirm the presence of oligopsonistic
market behavior in the Hungarian dairy industry. The cor-
responding parameter was estimated to be 0.22 in Model 3
and 0.30 in Model 4; a result that is, consistent with the
relatively high concentration ratios in the Hungarian dairy
industry and the considerable increase of the HHI as its
value tripled in the course of the last 7 years (cf. Table 3).
Moreover, based on the set of accessible plant-level data,
the econometric results corroborate the test characteristics
of effects reported by Hockmann and Vöneki (2009).
7 Summary and conclusions
Considering structural change in the Hungarian dairy
sector, there is empirical evidence that milk processors
may exercise market power in the input market for raw
milk. Juhász and Stauder (2006) concluded that the
Hungarian dairy industry is characterized by a duopolis-
tic market structure, i.e. dominated by two large milk
processors. As regards the number of market participants,
including both dairy plants and dairy farms, we draw the
conclusion that the structure of the Hungarian raw milk
market is best to be characterized as oligopsonistic. The
calculated values of the concentration ratios and the
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index indicate a moderately con-
centrated Hungarian dairy industry. Moreover, our find-
ings are supported by the empirical study of Hockmann
and Vöneki (2009) who found evidence for the existence
of market power estimating industry-wide indexes of oli-
gopsony market power on the basis of industry-level
data.
In the pursuit of providing an alternative approach to
evaluating (oligopsony) market power on applying plant-
level data, we evaluated previous empirical studies,
together with taking into account specific developments
in the Hungarian dairy industry, and specified a model
that generates benchmarks so as to efficiently test for
oligopsony market power. The empirical model consists
of a production function and the first order condition for
profit maximization which allows for imperfect competi-
tion in the input market for raw milk. The production
technology in the Hungarian dairy industry is repre-
sented by a translog production function, which imposes
considerably less a priori restrictions on the technology
than neoclassical production functions. All of the esti-
mated production elasticities were found to be positive at
the sample mean. A result also true of the production
elasticities of capital and labor, certainly; but they failed
to be highly statistically significant. The hypothesis of
Table 9 Wald test and estimates of the parameter of market power.
Model Oligopsony power and
plant-specific effects
Coef. Std. Err.
Model 2 ’C –0.0055*** (0.0012)
Model 3 ’C þ ’T þ ’PC þ ’SE 0.2219*** (0.0352)
Model 4 ’C þ ’T þ ’PC þ ’PE þ ’FE þ ’GE 0.3015*** (0.0598)
Notes: The values in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Own estimation based on the data from the Hungarian Tax
Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy
of Science, respectively.
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constant returns to scale could not be confirmed. Instead,
the econometric results revealed increasing returns to
scale in the Hungarian dairy industry.
We estimated the parameter of oligopsony market
power in the Hungarian dairy industry using plant-level
data. The null hypothesis test for perfect competition in
the Hungarian dairy industry was rejected. Furthermore,
in order to test for the effects of policy changes and plant-
specific effects on market power, subsets of relevant
parameters were specified. For this reason, in addition
to the basic model, three other models were estimated.
The estimation yielded highly statistically significant
coefficients as regards effects from policy changes over
time and plant-specific effects triggered by changes in
scale, and thus produced evidence of the exercise of
market power by Hungarian dairy enterprises. The coeffi-
cient on policy change is significant and indicates that
the abolition of export subsidies in 2004 has effects on
oligopsony power in the Hungarian dairy industry. Using
monthly time series observations from January 1998 to
October 2006 for at the industry level Hockmann and
Vöneki (2009) found similar results regarding the aboli-
tion of export subsidies in Hungary. At the same time,
effects of the ownership form of dairy plants led to incon-
sistent results: while effects of foreign owned enterprises
(plants) yielded significant, those of being either a private
or government enterprise did not. The econometric
results of models, together with the plant-specific effects,
provide empirical evidence of oligopsony market power
in the input market for raw milk. For the investigation
period from 1993 to 2006, the estimated parameter of
oligopsony market power amounted to 0.22 and 0.30,
respectively. This econometric result is consistent with
the oligopsonistic structure of the Hungarian dairy indus-
try and confirms the findings of earlier analyses of the
Hungarian market for raw milk.
Appendix
Table 10 Estimated parameters of FGNLS estimation with robust standard errors.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
α0 –0.0092 (0.0085) –0.0096 (0.0081) –0.0199 (0.0083) –0.0210 (0.0079)
αm 0.9635*** (0.0051) 0.9072*** (0.0078) 0.9173*** (0.0091) 0.9176*** (0.0084)
αc 0.0244 (0.0085) 0.0320* (0.0085) 0.0195 (0.0080) 0.0205 (0.0082)
αl 0.0277 (0.0130) 0.0908*** (0.0161) 0.0854*** (0.0162) 0.0841*** (0.0154)
αl –0.0042** (0.0016) –0.0033 (0.0016) 0.0000 (0.0013) –0.0002 (0.0013)
αmm 0.1354*** (0.0203) 0.1367*** (0.0178) 0.1349*** (0.0206) 0.1365*** (0.0202)
αcc 0.0134 (0.0122) 0.0158 (0.0109) 0.0084 (0.0096) 0.0082 (0.0098)
αll 0.0206 (0.0220) 0.0539* (0.0207) 0.0490 (0.0223) 0.0545* (0.0214)
γtt –0.0008 (0.0007) –0.0020** (0.0007) –0.0002 (0.0007) –0.0001 (0.0007)
αmc –0.0443*** (0.0132) –0.0395*** (0.0125) –0.0290** (0.0108) –0.0265* (0.0115)
αml –0.1008*** (0.0246) –0.1194*** (0.0222) –0.1180*** (0.0237) –0.1226*** (0.0233)
γmt –0.0147*** (0.0023) –0.0150*** (0.0022) –0.0009 (0.0030) –0.0010 (0.0032)
αcl 0.0613*** (0.0131) 0.0549*** (0.0117) 0.0482*** (0.0112) 0.0467*** (0.0112)
γct 0.0005 (0.0022) 0.0014 (0.0019) –0.0005 (0.0015) –0.0005 (0.0016)
γlt 0.0155*** (0.0023) 0.0163*** (0.0022) 0.0018 (0.0028) 0.0022 (0.0030)
’C –0.0087*** (0.0011) –0.0950*** (0.0109) –0.0966*** (0.0130)
’T 0.0134*** (0.0031) 0.0130*** (0.0032)
’PC 0.1822*** (0.0249) 0.1866*** (0.0243)
’SE 0.0016 (0.0017)
’PE –0.0046 (0.0128)
’FE 0.0301 (0.0186)
’GE 0.0007 (0.0015)
Notes: The values in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source: Own estimation based on the data from the Hungarian Tax Authority and the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of
Science, respectively.
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